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MICHAEL WILLIS, and
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10335

)

Defendants-Appellants. )
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RESPONDENT'S BllEF

STATEMENT OF 'lllE NATURE OF 'lllE

CASE

Tnia is an action for personal injuriaa
arising from a pedestrian auto colliaion
at the intersection of 300 \Jut and Highway
91 in St. George, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On a jury verdict, the lower court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defandanta in th& amount
of $10,000.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1b.e defendants seek a reversal of the

jud&lllent in favor of the plaintiff and a

new trial.

l

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Th.e Plaintiff-Respondent accepts the
facts stated in Defendants-Appellant•
brief as

L~r

a.s they

~o,

but d.sirea to

add additione.l facts thereto.

Plaintiff-Respondent will be referred
to herein as Plaintiff and Defendants-

Appellants as Defendants.
Officer Hutchings testified that the
sun wtrlle traveling east on Highway 91

created a problem ( Tr.28).

'!he defendant

noticed the sun as he came aaat on Highway 91; he noticed the sun on the wind-

sldeld. this happened every morning aa be

went to school and it did not irritate
him.

His car was equipped with viaore,

but he did not pull them down ( Tr.67).

Defendant was well acquainted with tti.

route as he traveled it to school many

times that ach.ool yaar.

HE KNEW 'DlE

salOOL CROSSING SIGN WAS THERE NEAR 300

2

WEST INTERSEC'fiON AS HE HAD SEEN IT MANY
TIMES (Tr. 66).

Defendant did not see plaintiff or
little Cannon girl in the intersection by
th.e time

he had entered the a-.e (Tr.69).

When defendant reached tbe weat croaawalk
of said intersection he saw a friend ou
the side and he nodded and waved bia hand

and when he looked back tha plaintiff and
i.ittlt! girl wera right in front of hill

and he hit his brakes (Tr.62).
Defendant saw plainti£f grab the little
gi.rl and turn her (Tr.68).
,

'lbe baDper hit

both plaintiff and little girl and they

fell to the side (Tr. 02).

Defendant did

not see plaintiff, Mr. Eager, until be waa
practically upon him and hit hia (Tr.69).
As a result of said accident plain..-tiff waa in a cast for eleven waeka and
two days ( Tr.38).

He suffered an injury

to his hand (Tr.38) which continued to
3

bother him even to the time of the trial

of the case (Tr.41).
'!bat at the t:Une of the last ex9in-

ation of the plaintiff by Dr. Ruaach, baf

ore. the trial of the case, to-wit, on

November 25th, 1964, ( Tr.10) ha complain-

ed of pain in the left ankle and left Jma&,
also pain above his le.it eyebrow wbare he

had suffered a large cut in said accident
-~~-.. ~~Au.plained

of headaches ( Tr.ll) and ha

was at the time suffering fraa poat-trauma tic arthritis (Tr.ll-12).
C•

Plaintiff

·uld not do what he had enjoyed before,

like fishing, hunting and pine-nut gathering, on account of injuries auatained.
(Tr.44-45).

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN STAHNG

THE ISSUES IN INSTRUCnoN

NO.l.

Instruction No. 1 aa cam.plained of by
counsel for defendant states the nature
4

of the case, the relief sought by the

plaintiff and the position of tha defendant in admitting the accident but denying

pla~ntiff

's injuries and stating de-

fendant's position in alleging that the accident was soley caused or proximately
contributed to by the plaintiff's own negligence.
It is suhnitted that the interpretation :cead into Instruction No. l by defendants counsel is strained and cartainly

not justified in view of further inatruct~ons,

to-~it,

Instruction No. 4 which

reads as follows:
"The party upon whom the burden of
proof rests, must sustain it by a preponderance of the evidance. 'l'be law
does not permit you to b~se a verdict
on speculation or conjecture aa to the
cnuse of the incident in question. If
the evidence does not preikonderate m
favor of the llaintiff, m inj?: the
chat!e of
igence then he baa £ailed o lulf it his &ifden of proOf and
your f Indlng must be agafut him on
that issue. In otherwords, if alter
considering all the evidence, i ! ahould
appear to you just as probable that the

ner

5

defendant driver ~as not negligent, as
that h.e was, or that his negligence, i f
any, was not a proximate cause of the
incident as that it was such a proximate
cause, then a case has not bean established against the defendant driver by
a preponderance of the evidence as the
law requires and the defendant driver
cannot be held liable." (r:..phaaia added).
The above

instruction, particularly

the

part emphasized clearly states where

t"Le

burden of proof i.s in the preae.nt

matter and the duty of the jury

~ith

re-

spect to considering all of the

evidenc1 ~

to de tennine the preponderance of the
same either for the plaintiff in hia allegations or defendants in their

deLi~l'.'J.

It is sulmitted that i f the Court had
included all of the pointa suggested by

defendant in Instruction No. l it would
have been con£using and it is further sub-

mitted that it is the Court's duty to
fully cover all of the matters bel.ore thn.

Court in the. instructions, which the C4urt
did fairly and plainly.
6

They are aum-

ll&rized in Instruction No. 29 in the follo~ing

words:

POINT NO. II
'!HE TRIAL COURT DID NOT C<J4MIT ERROR.

IN STAnliG 'DlE IIJTIES OWED 'It> PLAIRTIFF.

Defendants argue that the giri.ng of
lnatru.ctiona No. 15 and. 17 in effect directed that the defendant waa negligent
although the Cart did not rule that the
defendant waa negligent aa a aatter of law.
Defendant cite• Charvoz va. Cottrtll
(1961) 12 U. 2d 25, 361 P. 2d 516 in wtU.ch
case tie plaintiff contended that the de7

ceased had the right of way in a croaawalk and therefore the defendant waa nagl igen t aa a aatter of law.

The

facta in

that case ahow that the defendant waa tra-

Yaling in an autcaobile at approxiaately
30 milaa per hour aa be approached an intersection; that hia headlight• were on
low beam, that ba did not aae the dec.-d

until be waa about 60 to 65 feet frca the

point of iapact.

He applied Drakaa bat

was unable to a top tba car in t:lae to a-

Yoid hitting the decaaaed.

Tba plaintiff

contended that defendant should haft obaerved the deceaaed at leaat 100 feet

from the crosswalk, tharefore the defendant waa negligent in failing to keep a
proper lookout.
To thia point the Court atatea aa fol•

lows:

"'Ibis reasoning, however, overlook•
It waa

certain other pertinent facta.
8

dark at the time of the accident; the
street had a blacktop aurface; the intersection was only dial.y illuainated;
the backdrop, aa aeen from defendant'•
automobile, waa a dark vacant lot on
the. northeaat corner of the interaection; there was a car atopped on tba
north aide of the intersection with it' a
lights burning; and the decedent waa
we.aring dark clothing. Thar.fore, although tba evidence ia undiaputed tb.at
the defendant could have stopped his
car in t:lae to avoid the accident bad
he aen the deceased at a cliatance of
100 feet, the ci.rcuutancea are auch aa
to create a doubt in tba ainda of reaaonable men aa to defendant•• ability
to obaer9e the decedent at that diatanca
and hence tba iaaue of f allure to keep
a proper lookout vaa for tba jury."
'lhe Qilrt further holda in aaid ca•

that:

"Be.fore the duty of a driver to yield
tha right of way arise• he muat be ill
a situation whereby be ia eitb.er aware
of the preaence of a pedestrian within
the croaawalk or &b.ould hawa. in. the
exercise of reasonable care, bacaae a
ware of the pedestrian'• pre..nce in
time to yield the right of way."
We will agree with defendant• conten-

tion beginning second line from bott• of

Page 13 of hi• brief and continuing on
Page 14 as follows:
9

"that the driver of tho motor vehicle
had the duty to yield the right of way
to a pedestrian, but only when he is in
a situation where he is aware of the
presence of the pedestrian within the.
cross-wali:, or should have been aware,
in the exercise of ordinary care, of
the pedestrians presence in time to
yield the right of way."
i~.nd

it is plaintiff's contention that

by the exercise of ordinary care plain'!- -

tiff • s presence in the cirosswalk could

have been observed by defendant in ample

time to have yielded tbe right of way.

nu.a position ia baaed on

the following

reasons:
'Ihe defendant knew the location of
the school crossing becauae he had traveled the route many, many times during
the school year.

a.

b. He knew and had observed the signa
indicating the achool crossing many

ti.m&s.

c. After making a turn heading eaat
along the highway towards said school
croasing he noticed the sun on the
windshield, he bad noticed it many
times, but it did not irritate him.
His car was equipped with visors but he
did not use theta.

10

Whea ha approached tba iatenectt..
he looked to tba aide to great f rieada and. when he apia leoked toward
the roadway tbe plaintUf aDd tbe little

d.

Cannon drl were right 1a Ida path and

be could not atop.

c.rtainly witb

orcU.Dar7 can

be oeuld

have obserY8d the officer ia ..Uoa with
little girl by hie aide, bolcliq ap

the

hi.a banda and tr7iAg to pt hie atma1:1oa

to atop, and efta after ba utencl tbe ia-

terMCtioa, if he bad not - . . l•*i•& to
the aide and peetiag friaUa, be -14

uwa

obaerwd plaiatUf aa4 little girl ill

t!ae to ha•
We

•l

~lclM

tbe

ri&bt .r way.

f11.rthar agn.e vitll •l•daat'a - -

·ill tda atat••t in

au

brief

Oil . . . .

19 aa follovas
"If yoa •••nod the dafandaat drl...r
ha4 ao ucw fer Det . · - i q or
yie.1.diag to t1ae pedeatri.a, laetnRiea
llo. 17 certaial.1' woalcl lie p......-."

••t

It ia nlaitted tlaat tba pl.&iad.ff -

not naglipat ill jmping ill tbla pathwap
of the autcaobile

M

a4aitted MC•M la
ll

his attempt to stop the defendant he had
let go of the little Cannon girl's hand
and he was using both of his hands to at-

tract the attention of the defendant to
yield the right of watl and the little
girl had stepped across the center of the
highway and was in the :inn.ediate path of

the automobile which was at that tiae only
a few feet away.

He did eYerthing that

a hUllan being could do to try and aave.
the little girl and as a result both he

and the little girl received severe

in~a.

It is submitted that under the facts

above shown in the eri.dence Inatructiona
#15 and 1117 are not a mis-statement of the
law nor are they inconsistent with eacb.

other or with any of the other inatructiona

given.
POINT NO. III

nu.:

COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL

ERR.OR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION R>. 9.
12

It is subaitted that defendanta contention that the Court coaaitted three

prejudicial errors in giving Inatruction
No. 9 is not well taken because Ho. 9
should be con&idered with No. 10 which ia
as

follows:
"Even though you find in faV'Or of tba
plaintiff, and that the defendant waa
negligent, tbe plaintiff nevertbelaaa
may be barred frm recoYery by contributory negligence. Before contributory
negligence would preclude plaintiff'•
recovary, you amat find from a preponderance of the evidence, that each of
the two following propooitiou are true:
Propoaitiou Ro. l
That
.tile plaintif£ waa negligent in
one or more of the following particulara:

a. '!bat the plaintiff failed to obaerve the danger involv.d.
b. Plaintiff left a place of aafety
and moved into the path of a vahicle,
when the vehicle waa ao cloae that
it waa im.poaaible for the driver to
yie.l.d the right of way.
Propoaition Ho. 2
'lbat said negligence of the plaintiff,
if any, was a proximate and contribut13

ing cause of the accident • If you find
these two propositions against the
plaintiff, he cannot recove.r, even
though you find in favor of tha plaintiff and against the defendant on tbe
issue of ne.gligence of the defendant."
Both Instructions #9 and #10 should
be considered with Instruction #29 which

states specifically:
"you are. not to single out any certain
sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but
you are'> consider all the instructions
as a whole and are to regard e.ach in the
light of all the othera.u
It is aubmitted that under Instruction

No. 9 the jurors did find that the defen•
dant was negligent in either or both of

point 'a' in driving too fast for exist•
ing conditions or, point 'b' in failing
to keep a proper lookout for pedeatriana

in the crosswalk.
Defendant argues that the defendant waa
blinded by the sun there.fore could not
see.

If such was the

case then be was

certainly driving too fast for existing

14

conditions at 20 or 25 miles per hour in
a 30 mile posted zone.

If the sun was a

factor in obscuring his vision and view,
then he ignored the same, drove along at
the same speed '\vithuut regard to pedes-

trians in the school crossing.
If the sun was not a factor that he

need consider than his early morning
greeting t:o friends that took his atten-

tion away from the road ahead was ce.rtainly a failure

to keep a proper

lookout.

It is submitted that the jury is not
obligated to designate the particular
act of negligence upon which they base a

decision, and defendants argument that
when they did not in the present case

then in all probablity they fwnd negliger•... ~ upon an improper ground is specious.
POINT NO. IV
'IDE COURT DID NO'£ CCH1IT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING ON DAMAGES.

15

First let us con.aider whether or not
the judglaent rendered in the pruent caee

i• exceasive.
'1'he plaintiff, although 65 years of age

was in good heal th prior to tba accident
cOllplained of.

He bad lived acmawbat of au

outdoor, rugged life.

He enjoyed fiahing,

hunting and pine-nut gathering. whim piae-

nut gathering waa amewbat lucrative to
him in the

a&ASOD.

thereof I aad during the

auaaer aeaaon he worked at much mon lucra-

tive em.plo,aent than $100 .00 per month tbat
he waa getting from the City aa a Croui.ng

<bard.

All of which ia now dallied h:Ja

Oil

account of the iajuri.6• auatained..
Ha atill suffered frcm the injury
his

hand at the time of tba trial.

to
Bia

b.eadachea peraieted at that tiaa and hia

poat-tram.atic arthritis in the injured
leg prevented the outdoor acti•itiaa that
b.e had enjoyed and profited fr.a for so

16

many years prior to said injuries.
His headaches and suffering fran injured hand and post-traunatic arthritis
should not be minimized because he was
not

taking medication "pills" as defen-

dant calls them.

He would rather suffer

the pains from the injuries than the

sickness and nausea from the medication
which he had taken for re.lief but had to
abandon.

It is submitted that the award of
$10,000.00 for the injuries sustained,
for the suffering endured by the plain-

tiff for the eight months to the time of
the trial, for the depriYation of activi-

ties which had helped to make hi• life

worthwhile prior to the. injury and assurance that the injuries were not just

temporary but might continue for a
time and might even worsen.
17
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POINT NO. 5

EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WERE ROT AWARDED

UNDER n!E INFLUENCE OF IMPROPER ARGUMENT
OR FOR ANY O'DIER CAUSE.
The suggestion that the award of
$10 .000.00 was motivated by sane section

of the statute which requires that much.

liability insurance is wishful thinking
on the part of counsel for defendant be-

cause no such suggestion waa aver aada in
the trial of the case or in the ina truc-

tions to the jury and there waa no

indi-

cation that any of the juror• knew that
there was such a statute; Jmt it will be

admitted that moat people today know that
a large percentage of the owners of auto11obilaa carry liability iaaurance.

It is admitted that counsel for the
plaintiff felt a reaponaibility to pre•ent to the jury the. plaintiff' a caae aa

Well as possible. and i f counael wants to
call zeal in the presenting of tba case
18

''enthusiasm" or considerable enthuaia-" •

then counsel for the plaintiff will have
to plead guilty to this so called error.
Mr. Berry as counsel for the defendant

characterized as error the remark by
counsel for the defendant in hia addreaa
to the jury "not to conaide.r how the defendant would pay any damages found by
the jury," aa a atatement obvioualy made
to remind the jurors that inauran.ce

present.

waa

It ia .W:.itted that it ia not

the province of the jury to consider the

financial status of the defendant in a
111atter of this kind, but to observe the
ins tructiona of the Court, and they would

certainly be violating their oaths aa off ice rs

of the Court i f they attempted to

assess daaagea due the plaintiff fraa
the standpoint of defendant's ability to
pay.

Attention ia directed to the unfiniah-

19

ed statement by counsel for plaintiff in

his argument to the jury and which is reMr.
Berry (Appellant'• Brief page 29).

It

will be noted that the atateaent is not
f ini•hed

and whateftr intention counael

for plaintiff might ha,,. bad in beginning
th.a statement certaialy the part caaplai.nad

of ia not

prejudicial and

would not haft

been, had not Mr. Berry in hi• objection
finiabad what he thou&ht waa tba intended

statement of counsel in

the following

worda:

"I object to this •• improper tne of
argmient, asking the jury to couaider
tbeaaelftll in the aituation of the
wintiff. 'l'hia i• asking for QllP•thy
paaalon and ia not proper."
And tbe Court thereupon •tated:

"I have already instructed the jury

what counsel uya ia ru.terldence. It
ia merely arg1Dent. A.a to it•a -l'l'Opriety I • uncartain--" (Tr.78-79).
No further r.ference ia aade to the
objected

matter, and no referance wbat-

•oeve.r is aade to the "Golden Rule" and
20

it ia therefore submitted that no error

was committed by counsel in his rem.arks.
But if it can be held that the un-

finished statement was in error and any
inference that could have been drawn from.
it by the jury was objectionabl,e, then the

queation ariaea, did the aaae so inflame
the juror's prejudice or paaaion to the
extent that they awarded unreasonable
damage a for tha injuries proved.

In

otharworda were the damages determined by
th.e jury exceaaive, we sul:ait not.

In Ara. Jur-53, 64 Cum. Supp., Sec. 496

page 401 is a notation to add the following to Note 9:

"'nlere .are many cases in which it was
recognized that counsel's argument urging the jurors to place themaelvea
in the position of a litigant, or to
allow auch recoV'8ry as they would wish
if in the same position, waa improper,
but that the oppoaing party waa not entitled to relief on the ground of pre•
judice, in view of the c irc18atancea
present."
21

Several cases are also referred to in
70 ALR 2d, 937-945.

In 70 ALR 2d, pag•

945 Sec. 4 we find a Calilomia case referred to, DeYoung va. Haywood reported in

292 P. 2d 917 in wtich the Court aaidi

"An action to recove.r for iajuri.aa
sustained in an autcaobile accident,
the Court, aff iming a judgaent for
the plainti£f notwithstanding a statement in his attomey'a ar"981lt that

none of the jurors would be willing to
go through such an accident for
$9,000.00, said th t counsel for the
plaintiff in their brief very properly
did not try to justify the criticized

atatemant, but aerely contended that
it was not made with any improper
motive and waa not prejudicial; and
that certainly there waa notauch aiaconduct as would warrant a reveraal of
tna judpent •.
Quoting further fraa 70 ALR. 2d, page
954, Nota a--Verdict not esceaaiR·---

VERDICT NOT EXCESSIVE
n'lbat the verdict of the jury waa not

exceaaiva in amount baa been a factor
in a few caaea in reaching a determination that although counsel'• arguments urging the jurors to place t~
aal ves in the position of the litigant
or to allow such reeo'l8ry aa they would
22

wish if in the same position may have
been improper no prejudice resulted."
Then there are &any cases listed to
sustain that position.

Under the sae

reference liile find the following:
"A remark by counsel for the plaintiff to the jury, 'Wh.at would you have
your wife treated for?' was improper,
but was not of sufficient illlportanca
to justify a reversal of the judpent
for the plaintiff where the amount of
the verdict did not ind~ "".'ite that it
seriously affected the reaul t."

Crosswhite vs. Barnes, Va. 124
SE 242, 40 ALR 54.
It is submitted that if the unfin-

ished argument of plaintiff 'a counael referred to could be interpreted as being
improper and prejudicial

the circua•

stances of the case such aa the. statement
of the Court that the jury had already
been instructed that what counsel say• is
not evidence merely argument; that the
amount of damages awarded by the jury were

certainly justified in view of the injuri&a
23

sustained by the plaintiff aa shown by
plaintiff and Dr. Rutach.

The amount of

damage and the fact that it was in eYen
numbers, to-wit, $10,000.00, does not ahow
that the jurors were acting under prejudice

or passion or that they were motivated by
anything

other than a desire

to ccapen.-

sa te plaintiff in part for injuries sus-

tained, tbe pain and suffering enclure.d, and
the assurance that part of said injuries at

least would be permanent.

CONCLUSION
It is autmitted that no errors occurad
in the trial of the case complained of by

Appellant and that a new trial should be
denied and that said judgment should be
sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

PICKETT & PICKETr
Attorneys for PlaintiffReapondent
Pickett Building
St. George, Utah
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I hereby certify that on thia

day

of May, 1965, I mailed two copies of thia
BRIEF by united States Mail, postage pre-

paid, to Raymond M. Berry, Attom.ey at Lav,
Attorney for De.fendanta-.Appellants, 1473
South llth East, Salt Lake City, Utah

